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Historical perspective; a changing environment. 
In the last century, Globalization heavily conditioned the world's transformation. Drastic 
changes affected also the economic sphere: until the XV century, Feudalism, with 
fragmented economic agents and economic areas, was the form. Then, it was overtaken 
by Mercantilism and only in the middle of XVIII century the economic system and 
financial environment evolved in Industrial Capitalism; that further evolved in Modern 
Capitalism, where one of the key aspects is represented by the ease of movements of 
capital, goods and people in a unified and interconnected global market which should 
provide –  in some senses – the prosperity of the system and the achievement of market 
efficiency. The interconnections and the free movements of economic related elements 
are implicit in the capitalistic system and sometimes are safeguarded by the legislation. 
For instance, the European Union aims to create a Single Market (Art. 26, Treaty on the 
Functioning of the EU: TFEU) protecting the “free movement of goods, persons, services and 
capitals” (TITLE IV, TFEU; Art. 49 et seq.). All economic aspects, in fact, are affected by 
globalization: from human capital, to real goods, passing through financial assets; that in 
the last years reached 4 times the nominal world’s GDP (Illustration 1). Moreover, it can 
be noticed (Figures 1,2,3) how links in the financial sector increased both in the core of 
the network, but also in periphery. EU-zone countries, together with United States, 
Canada and Japan, are the core of the network and they play a key role in the functioning 
of the entire global economic system. 
 
 
Illustration 1: Financial assets as % of global GDP. 
Source: McKeynsey Global Institute. 
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Figure 1: Network of the cross-border banking system, 1980. 
Source: Minoiu, Camelia, and Javier A. Reyes, 2011, “A Network Analysis of Global Banking: 1978–2009,” IMF 
Working Paper 11/74 (Washington: International Monetary Fund). 
Figure 2: Network of the cross-border banking system, 2007. 
Source: Minoiu, Camelia, and Javier A. Reyes, 2011, “A Network Analysis of Global Banking: 1978–2009,” IMF 
Working Paper 11/74 (Washington: International Monetary Fund). 
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The European financial supervision 
From the sub-prime crisis started in 2007 that caused a global recession, it was clear that 
national regulators, and supranational entities, like the European Union in the Euro-
zone, should safeguard the financial system and insure its stability. Investors should be 
able to rely on the system; as from their trust depends the entire efficiency of the market. 
After the crisis of 2007-2008, the De Larosière report of 2009, addressed to the European 
Commission, tried to delineate the framework of reforms that were needed to update, in 
the light of the recent events, the previous system designed by the Lamfalussy report, 
originally developed in 2001. The De Larosière report, suggested to substitute the third 
level of independent advisory groups, namely the Committee of European Banking 
Supervisors (CEBS), the Committee of European Security Regulators (CESR) and the 
Committee of European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Supervisors (CEIOP), 
with the so-called European Supervisory Authorities (ESAs): European Banking Authority 
(EBA), European Securities and Market Authority (ESMA) and the European Insurance 
and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA). Finally, crucially for the aspects analyzed 
in this paper, there was the creation of the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB), whose 
role is to assess and contribute to macro-prudential analysis and help to prevent systemic 
risk and contagion effects; which are very likely in periods of turmoil, especially for the 
interconnectedness shown before (Figure 3). The ESRB, together with the ESAs, the Joint 
Committee of the ESAs, and the national authorities, constitute the European System of 
 
Figure 3: Core of the network of the cross-border banking system, 2007. 
Source: Minoiu, Camelia, and Javier A. Reyes, 2011, “A Network Analysis of Global Banking: 1978–2009,” IMF 
Working Paper 11/74 (Washington: International Monetary Fund). 
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Financial Supervision (ESFS). The ESFS shall put together the micro-prudential 
supervision made by the ESAs and the macro-prudential conducted by the ESBR. 
 
Further developments in EU supervision; the Banking Union 
ESFS coordination was not enough to avoid the crystallization of markets. For this reason, 
the European Commission, in 2012, proposed the Banking Union, whose aim is to create 
a safer environment, founded in the single rulebook i.e. a collection of prudential law that 
include mainly the Capital Requirements Regulation (CRR), the Capital Requirements 
Directive (CRD IV), the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD) and the 
Deposit Guarantee Schemes Directive (DGSD). 
Trying to realize the Banking Union, it was introduced with Reg. 1024/2013 the Single 
Supervisory Mechanism (SSM), with Reg. 806/2014 the Single Resolution Mechanism 
(SRM) and the Deposit Guarantee Scheme (DGS), reviewed in 2014 from the original 
Dir. 94/19/EC. 
The SSM is composed by the European Central Bank (ECB) and national authorities; it 
has power to “[i] conduct supervisory reviews, on-site inspections and investigations [ii] grant or 
withdraw banking licences [iii] assess banks’ acquisition and disposal of qualifying holdings [iv] 
ensure compliance with EU prudential rules [v] set higher capital requirements (“buffers”) in order 
to counter any financial risks”. It supervises 129 banks that hold more than the 80% of 
banking assets in Euro area (ECB, 2016). 
 
Illustration 1: European System of Financial Supervision. 
Source: Finanssivalvonta, authority for supervision of Finland’s financial and insurance sectors. 
http://www.finanssivalvonta.fi. 
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The logical follow-up, the SRM, aims to ensure that issues regarding distressed and failing 
banks are solved in the quickest way and with the lowest economic cost possible. 
Finally, the DGS was created to ensure that – in case of distress – up to 100 000€ are paid 
to depositors. 
 
The Basel accords 
From Basel I to Basel II 
Basel agreements1 are voluntary accords on banking supervision proposed by the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS). Each country or entitled institution has 
then to implement them; the first agreement was Basel I of 1988 and it was created to give 
common methodologies and common rules for capital adequacy. Notably, with Basel I 
was given a common rule for credit risk and prudential regulation. The regulatory capital 
was composed by TIER 1 like stock issues, non-distributed earnings and declared reserves, 
and TIER 2 as all other capitals like hybrid instruments, investment assets, long term debt 
with maturity greater than 5 years etc.  The proposed assessment of credit risk was based 
on the Risk Weighted Asset (RWA); in a similar way to a weighted sum of the bank’s 
assets, different financial instruments carry different risk weights. They were organized in 
5 categories: 0% (e.g. cash or treasuries), 20% (e.g. MBS with AAA rating), 50% (e.g.  some 
municipalities bonds) or 100% (e.g. corporate bonds); in addition, there were assets with 
no rating. Once computed the RWA, banks with international activities had to hold, as 
capital, at least the 8% of the RWA2. Dividing the RWA by the Tier 1 Capital, is possible 
to obtain the Common Equity Tier 1 (CET1), which still is often used as a capitalization 
measure. Under BCBS lines – starting from the amendment of 19963 – not only Credit 
Risk should have been considered, but also Operational and Market Risk. To capture the 
latter, the concept of Value at Risk (VaR) was used. The VaR at x% is, simply, the x% 
quantile of the distribution of returns; it is “the worst loss over a target horizon that will not 
be exceeded with a given level of confidence”4 (Jorion, 2007). Notably, in the legislation the 
probability was set at 1% and the horizon at 10 days; with at least one year of data 
available. However, VaR is not a good measure of risk since it does not respect 
subadditivity5, even if it helped in starting to give a glance about what – in the future – 
                                                 
1 Similar milestones were applied in Europe with Solvency II in the insurance sector (Dir. 2009/138/CE) and for IORP in 
the pension fund (Institutions for Occupational Retirement Provision Dir. 2003/41/EC);  
2 Total capital ratio 8%, Tier 1 capital at 4%; 
3 It was also introduced a Tier 3 capital for market risk that was some years after removed;  
4 Formally, 𝑉𝑎𝑅 (𝑝) is that value such that 𝑝 = ∫ 𝑓(𝑞) 𝑑𝑞
𝑉𝑎𝑅 (𝑝)
−∞  where 𝑓(𝑞) is the probability density function of the 
returns; 
5 i.e. 𝜑(𝑋 + 𝑌) ≤ 𝜑(𝑋) + 𝜑(𝑌); 
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would have been stress tests; in fact, the question to which VaR answers is “what happens 
if we are in the worst case” i.e. the negative tail of the distribution.  
VaR models were widely used also in Basel II, which was published in 2004 and 
implemented in 2008.  
Basel II proposed a three pillars model with: 
1) Minimum capital requirement; with a new coefficient of solvability including, apart 
from credit risk, also market risk and operational risk. Moreover, banks could decide to 
use a standardized or a personalized/internal model (for instance with Internal Rating-
Based approach, IRB) for measure risk. With IRB the bank had to estimate the Probability 
of Default (PD), Loss Given Default (LGD), Exposure At Default (EAD), which is the line 
of credit used by the debtor in case of insolvency, and Maturity. All these variables should 
be included for the computation of the Expected Loss (EL); 
2) Supervisory review; competent authorities should have significant powers in evaluating 
the patrimony adequacy. In addition, banks should conduct the Internal Capital 
Adequacy Assessment Process (ICAAP) and proper risk management functions; 
3) Market discipline; especially regarding transparency and disclosure. 
 
Basel III 
After the crisis in 2010-2011, Basel III was approved. It is forward looking in the sense 
that mandates risk assessments on specific portfolios, depending also on the 
macroeconomic environment. It introduces higher minimum capitals and quality 
capitals, distinguishing between going concern capital Tier 1 (purest: CET1), with the 
logic of preventing crisis, and gone concern capital with the logic of ensuring depositors 
and senior creditors can be repaid in case of insolvency: Tier 2 capital) limiting leverage 
ratios. It introduces liquidity risk and highlights the idea of stress tests under pillar 2 ‘risk 
management and supervision’ (point 115; BIS, 2011). Capital requirements for 
derivatives, leverage limits and capital buffers (capital to require in addition to the 
minimum capital) were also introduced. 
In Europe, it has been implemented with the Credit Requirements Directive IV (CRD 
IV, Dir. 2013/36/EU) and Credit Requirements Regulation (CRR, Reg. 575/2013) and 
growing importance is given to stress tests.  
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Illustration 2: Implementation of Basel III in Europe. Capital Structure. 
Source: European Commission, Q&A (2013) 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-13-690_en.htm 
 
 
In addition to ICAAP – proposed as seen with Basel II – Internal Liquidity Adequacy 
Assessment Process (ILAAP) was introduced; it synthetizes the liquidity risk of a bank. 
ICAAP and ILAAP together with Business Model and Governance & Risk Management 
constitute the Supervisory Review and Evaluation Process (SREP; EBA/GL/2014/13). 
The SREP is a synthesis of the results of a year of analysis (Banking Supervision EU, 2016), 
useful for supervisors to assess how solid a bank is; even using future adverse scenarios: 
stress tests (point 5.6.3 of EBA/GL/2014/13). According to the results of the SREP – 
which should be conducted at least once a year – the competent authority can ask for 
supplementary capitals, a reinforcement of governance, disinvestments and all operations 
required to ensure the stability of the bank and henceforth the stability of the banking 
system. 
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Stress tests 
A stress test can be defined as a quantitative and statistical simulation that the supervisor 
or the entity conduct to assess in which way a micro agent is likely to react, in the specific 
scenario that has been assumed. It is a forward-looking assessment in the sense that 
investigates how capital and liquidity could vary in specific situations that trigger different 
variables and different risks; stress tests are also useful to get early warnings, trying to 
anticipate and limit crisis events (Papademos, 2007). In the banking sector, EBA – 
together with the ESRB – is allowed to use stress tests6 in order to assess the strength of 
financial institutions and of market operators to adverse market developments. Stress tests 
can be thought as sensitivity analysis, changing one factor, or as scenario analysis, 
changing more factors at the same time. They are, in general, inspired to historical events 
and adjusted for changes in risks; they should value dependence and cyclicality with 
capital requirements in accordance with the two pilasters. 
 
 
Stress tests under EU law 
Stress tests had been used since the last century, but only in the very last years they started 
to be considered in a relevant way by the regulator. The main legal provisions can be found 
in CRD IV, CRR and EBA guidelines. Article 98 of CRD IV describing ‘Technical criteria 
for the supervisory review and evaluation’ clearly states that “In addition to credit, market 
and operational risks, the review and evaluation performed by competent authorities pursuant to 
Article 97 [SREP] shall include at least (…)” and includes business model, liquidity risk, 
systemic risk, results from internal model regarding Title IV of CRR i.e. “own funds 
requirements for market risk”. Liquidity and market risks shall be incorporated in the 
ILAAP and ICAAP and, together with business model and risk management, are the four 
pillars of the Supervisory Review and Evaluation Process (SREP), ex Art. 97 supervisory 
authorities shall assess and review it properly (Art. 97). But also in Article 177 of CRR, 
entitled ‘Stress tests used in assessment of capital adequacy’, it is reported that evaluations 
shall be conducted also bearing in mind potential stress cases: 
“(1) An institution shall have in place sound stress testing processes for use in the assessment of its 
capital adequacy. Stress testing shall involve identifying possible events or future changes in economic 
conditions that could have unfavourable effects on an institution's credit exposures and assessment 
of the institution's ability to withstand such changes.  
                                                 
6 In the U.S. has been widely used and is reported also in the Dodd-Frank act; 
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(2) An institution shall regularly perform a credit risk stress test to assess the effect of certain specific 
conditions on its total capital requirements for credit risk.  (…) The test to be employed shall be 
meaningful and consider the effects of severe, but plausible, recession scenarios. (…)”  
There is also an important role for accountability with a crucial role of management ex 
Article 290: 
“When evaluating solvency under stress, the shocks of the underlying risk factors shall be sufficiently 
severe to capture historical extreme market environments and extreme but plausible stressed market 
conditions. The stress tests shall evaluate the impact of such shocks on own funds, own funds 
requirements and earnings (…)” 
“The results of the stress testing under the programme shall be reported regularly, at least on a 
quarterly basis, to senior management. (…) Senior management shall take a lead role. (…)” 
Finally, the requirements for stress test are clearly stated also in Article 100 of CRD IV: 
“(1) The competent authorities shall carry out as appropriate but at least annually supervisory stress 
tests on institutions they supervise, to facilitate the review and evaluation process under Article 97.  
(2) EBA shall issue guidelines in accordance with Article 16 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 
to ensure that common methodologies are used by the competent authorities when conducting annual 
supervisory stress tests.” 
On this wave, the last wide stress test was announced by EBA on 25th November 2015 and 
then launched in early 2016 covering the 70% of the banking sector: a total of 53 banks 
39 of which under the SSM. It was not a pass/fail exercise since, as explained by EBA in 
its Q&A, the average CET1 was more than 13% and there was not an immediate need 
for capitalization and there were not dramatic situations. The tests included two scenarios 
realized by the ESRB in cooperation with EBA and ECB: a baseline scenario and an 
adverse scenario. In particular, the scenario had negative shocks on interest rates, 
exchange rates, stock price, GDP growth rate in the world and, remarkably, for EU 
countries (for instance in Italy was assumed a percentage change in GDP of -0.4, -1.1, 0 
for years 2016, 2017, 2018), inflation/deflation, unemployment and house prices. The 
results – synthetized in page 33 of the EBA results report – have shown an acceptable 
situation. In Italy Intesa Sanpaolo was the one with the better results: 12.80% on baseline 
scenario and 10.21% in adverse scenario, while Mps was one of the worst with a CET1 of 
12.04% in the baseline but a negative 2.23% in the adverse scenario.  The National 
Competent Authorities has the task to check that everything is done in the proper way 
and according to EBA’s methodology. After, these results – useful also for market 
transparency – were passed to competent authorities beneficial to guide targeted 
interventions.  
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Main flaws of current stress tests 
However, there are several flaws regarding stress tests. Firstly, a main issue is how stress 
tests are generated: they are mainly concerned with a limited number of scenarios and the 
corresponding assumptions. As just seen (cfr. supra), the adverse scenario, in the wide stress 
test of 2016, was only one. Furthermore, it is unknown how likely the proposed scenarios 
are and with which probability they will be effectively observed. In addition, they rely on 
macroeconomic variables that should then be converted in the microeconomic variables 
that directly affect the financial institution and its business; hence, other models are 
necessary and in many cases the links between the variables are not even clear. An example 
that often is made is how to translate a negative change in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
into stock returns. One may think that there is clearly a positive correlation; however, 
correlations are not as strong as one may think and sometimes there could be even a 
negative correlation between the two factors; creating another step in the statistical 
implementation could lead to misleading results. Moreover, it shall be pointed out that 
macroeconomic movements could be just a change because of the crisis and not the cause 
itself. Hence, the true fundamentals might not be touched by the analysis. Besides, in 
models there are implicit assumptions of linearity between variables and independence 
between phenomenons. In reality, it is much more complex; events might not be 
independent and a change of one variable could create endogenous risk creating a vortex 
that sometimes is not considered by stress tests: the world is not linear. In addition, in 
some cases supervisory stress tests can be conducted by banks themselves with internal 
models (e.g. IRB for ratings), introducing the issue of moral hazard: banks might be 
incentivized to avoid aspects where they are weaker and could tend to manipulate models 
to get better results (Montesi and Papiro, 2015). Finally, the severity of scenarios shall be 
appropriately chosen. Stress testing on very bad scenarios could – of course – show 
criticalities and if results are made public could lead even to the self -fulfilling prophecy 
that in many cases are described in the economic literature. When conducting stress 
testing exercises, it should be kept in mind that two variables are crucial (i) the profitability 
of the credit institution and (ii) the capital requirements. Injecting other capital 
requirements, because severe – and in some cases unlikely – stress tests suggest to do so, 
could not be the right choice. The main issue is to understand if the entity is profitable; 
keeping injecting capital in a economic-dead firm is not a proper solution and should be 
avoided. Especially, considered that increasing the capital reduces the profitability and 
returns even more. 
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What could be done 
Once expired the deadline for the implementation of Basel III, that currently is 2019, 
Basel IV will be the next step in banking regulation. It should try to amend these flaws, 
even if there is a lot of debate on these rules. On 24 th March 2016, Basel Committee 
stated that it would have suggested to move these tests from an internal base to a validated, 
standardized approach. Banks and, especially, the Securities Industry and Financial Mar-
kets Association (SIFMA) harshly criticized this decision (Risk.net, 2016), giving the idea 
of how difficult could be to match all the interests. EBA is currently drafting the ‘Guide-
lines on stress testing and supervisory stress testing’ (EBA/CP/2015/28), ex art. 100 Dir. 
2013/36/EU. Some aspects could be improved following the suggestions by Montesi and 
Papiro (2015). In particular, it shall be needed to design multiple scenarios, even with 
usage of Monte Carlo Markov Chain (MCMC) simulations, that will include also micro-
economic variables that could change the results of the stress test, for instance also in-
cluding conduct risk and giving importance to all the risks that a bank could hold. More-
over, it is crucial to think about variables having in mind stochastic distributions: varia-
bles, instead of being fixed and deterministic, shall have proper Probability Distribution 
Functions (PDF) and results should be used and interpreted according to where they be-
long in the distribution.  
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